When socialist planned economies were first being transformed into market economies, a naive optimism ruled. The transition could be achieved, it was thought, by simply privatizing state-owned enterprises and by introducing the equity market as a means of corporate control. This textbook notion of the capitalist system disregarded issues of political economy, as well as the historical development of national institutions. Recommendations based on such beliefs have proved either unrealistic or simplistic: no single model is appropriate for every country. This volume presents the results of research on corporate governance in transitional economies from the new perspective of comparative institutional analysis. Under this approach, banks and other outside institutions can play an important role in providing corporate governance. In the traditional model, efficient governance is meant to enable stockholders to exercise corporate control. The volume discusses: 1) theoretical foundations of corporate governance structures; 2) comparative country experiences; and 3) the relevance of lessons from Germany and Japan. By comparing and evaluating various systems of governance, the authors seek to uncover the factors that support or impede effective corporate control, including historical and socioeconomic conditions and institutional environments. In designing corporate governance structures, economists should identify the specific conditions under which each model of corporate control (or combination of models) can work, the availability of these conditions in the transitional economies, and the most efficient way of achieving these conditions.