A very interesting book. It is very well written (jargon-free anlysis). Renshon presents a theory for preventive war based on six different variables: 1) declining power motivation; 2) inherent bad faith relationship with adversary; 3) belief of inevitability of war; 4) belief in window of opportunity; 5) situation favouring the offensive; 6) black-and-white thinking.



Looking to identify and assess the decision-makers motivations for preventive action, the author uses a comparative case study method to test his theory. The cases selected are the Suez Crisis, Israeli strike against Iraqi nuclear facility, US Cold War strategy, India-Pakistan conflict, and Operation Iraqi Freedom.



Renshon concludes by highlighting the importance of individual leaders perceptions in choosing preventive action. The author also reflects on the association between preventive action and the failure of deterrence, calling attention to the future policy options between these two strategies.