Daniel Dennett has become the pivot point for all modern ideas in human cognition - philosophy's successor term. Unlike the classical philosophers, Dennett adheres to no "school" of philosophy. Indeed, one of the editors of this book attempts to coin the phrase "Dennettian" to establish a new such identity - an effort Dennett himself simply ignores. Dennett's many writings do not lend themselves to any rigid classification. Pinning him down is attempting to transfix the ultimate moving target. Dennett's tactics have led to criticism ranging from mild admonitions to scathing invective. This group of essays, resulting from a 1998 conference at Memorial University in Newfoundland, is a collection of advice, critique and demands for explanation from this innovative thinker . The book's tone is
perfectly captured in Dennett's response essay, "With A Little Help From My Friends." It is pure "Dennettian."

Don Ross' Introduction expresses the frustration many have felt about Dennett's writings: "Do Dennett's works `come together' into a coherent view of the world?" The answer to that question must be sought in the essays as each author struggles to address it through various elements found in Dennett's writings. The first part takes up his views on evolution. This is right and proper, since his "Darwin's Dangerous Idea" [DDI] is easily the most important book published since Darwin's "Origin of Species." Timothy Crowe challenges various aspects of Dennett's view of how evolution works, falling, quite consciously, into Stephen Gould's assertions about "maladaptations." Paul Dumouchel's following essay on Dennett's use of Forced Moves and Good Tricks in DDI shows how a critic must demonstrate understanding before offering appraisal.

Following these openings, the essays move into a more "philosophical" vein. [Dennett would argue those "scare quotes" would deter some or mislead others!] Ruth Millikan, adhering to Dennett's stand that cognition is a human extension of the evolutionary processes, suggests modification to a fundamental of Dennett's thinking - the Intentional Stance. She wants better identification of "intentionality" of natural selection. Her unease is echoed in Tom Polger's essay on the use of "conceptual fictions" such as "zombies," artificial biological beings with no discernible intentionality, a concept Dennett has repeatedly rejected.

Other essays in this collection further attempt to fix Dennett's ideas within some identifiable framework. Christopher Viger, Timothy Kenyon and William Seager, particularly the latter, all seek Dennett's abandonment of a "purely naturalistic rule" for his thinking. These admonitions Dennett dismisses as a misunderstanding of how nature works. Flexibility is the key, and is Dennett's lodestone. Among the remaining essays, Andrew Brook's symbolizes the dichotomy faced by Dennett adherents: how to fix on that elusive object without eroding its valuable contents. Brook reminds us that Dennett has spent thirty years giving us an account of consciousness. In that time, Dennett has challenged long-standing concepts in philosophy. Brook implores Dennett to clarify several of his definitions, in particular the distinction between the "seeming" of an object and the actual "subject" under discussion. How do we distinguish between a thing and our idea of that thing? Brook disclaims any attempt to bring down Dennett's Multiple Drafts model of consciousness, but feels he has "domesticated it a bit." Reader unfamiliar with the Multiple Drafts model are urged to take up Dennett's "Consciousness Explained" for the most innovative idea of the mind's workings currently available.

Space limitations forbid a thorough recapitulation of all the essays. It goes without saying that Dennett directly addresses each essayist's points [where these are discernible, which isn't always the case]. He acknowledges where clarity in his work is required, but often finds the interpreter has missed his meaning. In philosophical writing, that is often a given. With most explanations of human reasoning being labelled with various "-isms," Dennett stresses his discomfort with such constraints. He's to be admired for resisting such limitations, and reading his responses, we are reminded again of why the conference was convened. Dennett is more than a square peg resisting a round hole. He's polygonal, reflecting the scope of his diversity of interests and abilities. He stands apart from "mainstream" concepts, remaining unique as the leading figure in cognitive studies.