In this book Searle extends upon his argument in his essay "How to Derive Ought from Is", where he argued that the institutional fact of making a promise by definition places one under a moral obligation to fulfill it. I hoped that he would clarify his argument and answer objections (for example, that promises are only kept for the instrumental purpose of maintaining one's reputation). However, I was gravely disappointed because his analysis of institutional facts is self-consciously naturalistic. Under his analysis, an individual's obligation to keep a promise is analogous to, for example, a batter's obligation to stop batting after three strikes. Institutional facts are created by constitutive rules accepted by collective agreement, and the rights and obligations that individuals have are determined by those constitutive rules. This analysis, while normative, seems not only to add nothing to prove the existence of external reasons, but also has some rather problematic consequences for moral philosophy:



1. Rights exist only by virtue of collective agreement and convention. Individuals deserve, are entitled to, or are owed only what society grants them.

2. Obligations should only be followed if it serves some desire or purpose of the individual. While obligations may exist objectively as part of an institution, the individual's reason to fulfill the obligation is purely instrumental.



At the very least, the book is successful at answering emotivist arguments that normative statements are incoherent. Searle provides a very clear alternative: To say, "You ought to keep your promises," is to say, "There is an institution of promise-keeping, and within this institution to make a promise is to place yourself under an obligation to keep them." However, altogether I am unimpressed.

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